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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, 
: INCARCERATED 
v. 
DARREN NEIL GREUBER, JR., 
: CaseNo.20060009-SC 
DEFENDANT/PETITIONER. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction on certiorari under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This Court granted certiorari as to the following issues: 
1. Whether an attorney's failure to investigate evidence that would militate in 
favor of accepting a plea bargain may meet the requirement of demonstrating 
prejudice for an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2. Whether the record adequately supports the district court's finding that 
Petitioner would not have accepted the State's plea offer even if his trial 
counsel had fully investigated the State's evidence. 
See, Order, dated April 20,2006. This Court will review the court of appeals' decision, not 
the opinion of the trial court. State v. Leatherbury, 65 P.3d 1180,1182 (Utah 2003). A claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. Legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness and factual findings will be set aside only if they 
are clearly erroneous. State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Greuber was charged by information October 30,2001, with one count of murder and 
one count of aggravated kidnaping (R4a-4c). On January 15, 2002, the State filed its Fourth 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, disclosing the existence of relevant 
information contained on compact discs that were available for review or copying (R38). 
Greuber was tried with co-defendant Kenneth Paul Hunter (R123). Counsel for 
Greuber told the jury that Greuber would testify (R231:115). However, after the State rested, 
Greuber's counsel indicated in chambers that the defense needed to review the compact discs 
with the district attorney to determine in light of that evidence, which the defense was not 
previously aware of, if Greuber would still testify (R231:l 16). 
After reviewing the compact discs, the defense moved for a mistrial (R231:120). 
Although trial counsel had advance notice that the State was in possession of recordings of 
Greuber's jail telephone conversations, trial counsel failed to review those recordings, and 
the evidence contained therein entirely destroyed Greuber's planned defense (R231:121). 
The essence of that defense was that a jail informant had learned details about the crime from 
reading Greuber's discovery, rather than from Greuber's alleged confession to the informant. 
The State argued that it had given the defense notice of the discs containing Greuber' s 
letters and phone calls from the jail (R37-39; R231:124). The trial court denied the defense's 
motion for mistrial, ruling that a curative instruction would suffice (R231:128-129). Greuber 
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and his counsel then asked the State to reinstate its plea offer to one count of murder, which 
had been available to Greuber up until trial, but the State declined (R458:9, 10, 58, 60, 70, 
73,79, 83). Greuber was subsequently convicted of both charges, sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum of fifteen years to life for the kidnaping and a consecutive five years to life for the 
murder. Greuber timely filed a Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2003 (R209-218). 
This case was remanded to the trial court for findings under Rule 23B, and the trial 
court entered its Findings of Fact on September 14, 2004 (R452-457), finding that Greuber 
was not prejudiced by his trial counsels' failure to investigate Greuber's recorded telephone 
conversations because he would not have accepted the State's plea offer in any event. Id. 
On appeal, Greuber argued that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance for 
failing to know about the compact discs; and that but for trial counsels' objectively deficient 
performance, Greuber would have pleaded guilty to murder and received an indeterminate 
sentence of five years to life instead of the minimum mandatory term of fifteen years to life 
for aggravated kidnaping and a consecutive five years to life for murder. 
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected Greuber's arguments and affirmed his 
convictions, holding that "because Defendant has no right to a plea bargain, he could not be 
prejudiced by any purported deficient performance during the plea bargain process." State 
v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480, \5. The court of appeals also determined that the trial court's 
finding that Greuber would not have accepted the State's plea offer was supported by the 
record. Id. at \l. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Greuber was charged by information filed October 30,2001, with one count of murder 
and one count of aggravated kidnaping (R4a-4c). On January 15, 2002, the State filed its 
Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, stating in relevant part: 
The compact discs containing letters from the defendant, as well as the defendant's 
telephone calls, are available for review at the District Attorney's Office. Copies will 
be made if defense counsel will provide eight (8) blank compact discs. 
(R38attl2). 
Defense counsel never investigated those recordings (R261-286). Greuber was tried 
with co-defendant Kenneth Paul Hunter in November 2002 (R123). The State's primary 
witnesses were members of the white supremacist gang, Silent Aryan Warriors ("SAW"), and 
drug addicts (R229:36-101, 149-216; R230: 5-61, 129-238; R231:5-78). The State also 
called a jailhouse informant, David Corcoran, who testified that Greuber had confessed to 
the crime while they were cell mates at the Davis County Jail (R230: 70-78; 82-83). 
Shortly after the State rested, defense counsel stated in front of the jury that Greuber 
would testify in his own defense (R231:115). After the jury was excused, Greuber's counsel 
told the court, "There is something we need to review with the D.A.'s office . . . for Mr. 
Grueber, before we can even talk to Mr. Grueber about putting him on. It's something that 
we are not sure if we have, or we're not sure if we have a copy of... but it is something that 
we've got to review before we can talk about putting Mr. Grueber on" (R231:116). 
A subsequent review of that evidence revealed that Greuber's planned defense was 
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no longer viable and his counsel moved for a mistrial (R231:120). Defense counsel, Steven 
Shapiro, stated: 
". . . [A]s far as counsel for Mr. Grueber is concerned, the State notified us that 
there existed some recordings of telephone calls which were made at the Davis 
County Jail involving Mr. Grueber and parties outside the jail. . . . we also 
acknowledge that the State told us about them by way of a single line in a pleading 
entitled a supplemental response to request for discovery. . . . [which] suggests that 
there are recordings which are available for review at the district attorney's office and 
also that if we were to supply blank compact discs that those recordings would be 
provided to us. . . . that wasn't something which we focused on. . . . quite frankly, 
both Mr. Finlayson and I were both unaware of the existence of these recordings until 
after the lunchtime break today. Unfortunately, for our position, immediately 
preceding the lunchtime break we, or I said in the presence of jury that we intended 
to call Mr. [Floyd] McCallister as a witness and also that we intended to place Mr. 
Grueber on the witness stand as a witness. And that in light of the audiotapes, which 
we've now, over the lunch hour had the opportunity to review in the district attorney's 
office, neither of those things is possible. Because of the content of those recordings 
it just simply is not feasible from any legal strategy standpoint to call either of those 
witnesses, whether it be ethical or other considerations." 
"Of course, the difficulty that puts us in is that the approach that we had taken 
before learning of those tapes was to attempt to discredit the State's version of the 
events by using this Mr. McCallister as a witness to rebut the notion of Mr. 
Corcoran's testimony that Darren had confessed while in jail. 
"We feel like we promised the jury that that's what they were going to hear 
from us and they now are not going to be able to hear that from us. And as a result 
of that and as a result of now just learning of the existence of these tapes we feel like 
we've been put in the position where we can't follow through with promises we made 
to the jury during opening, and subsequently, and for that reason simply would ask 
that the court grant us a mistrial so that Mr. Grueber doesn't suffer the burden of that 
oversight, either oversight by us, if we're charged with responsibility of those things 
identified in the pleadings, or difficulty in the way of the State not presenting that 
information to us by means of discovery." 
(R231:120-122). 
Vincent Meister of the district attorney's office responded that the defense was 
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informed of the tapes ten months prior to trial (R231:124). Meister explained that David 
Corcoran reported Greuber's confession on or about November 16, 2001. However, in a 
recorded telephone call on November 21,2001, Greuber told his grandmother that he had not 
yet received his discovery (R231:125). This recording destroyed Greuber's planned defense 
by proving that David Corcoran did not learn the details of the crime from Greuber's 
discovery (R231:125-26, 128). This evidence also suggested that McCallister's expected 
testimony that Corcoran had read Greuber's discovery would be false (R231:126). 
The State argued against the motion for mistrial, suggesting a curative instruction was 
sufficient to address any prejudice that might occur when Greuber and McCallister did not 
testify as the jury expected (R231:126). The State did not address the prejudice that occurred 
when Greuber learned for the first time after the State rested that he no longer had a defense. 
The State only argued that defense counsel should have been aware through their own 
investigations that Corcoran could not have learned the details of Greuber's case from 
discovery because it was clear that the discovery was sent to defense counsel after Corcoran 
was moved to a different part of the jail (R231:128). The court denied the motion for 
mistrial, ruling that a curative instruction would suffice (R231:128-129).] 
When the jury returned, Greuber's counsel stated that Greuber would rely on his Fifth 
Amendment right to not testify, then rested without presenting any defense (R232:11). The 
Counsel for Hunter asked that his name be removed from the cautionary 
instruction (R232:6). 
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trial court then instructed the jury: 
"Counsel have asked that I read this instruction to you, even before I read the 
rest of these instructions, so I'll do that now. Mr. Grueber has decided to rest his case 
and rely on his constitutional right to put the state to its burden of proving each 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. You are instructed that such a decision is 
constitutionally protected and perfectly acceptable. As jurors you are not to speculate 
as to the reasons for his decision or to draw any inferences adverse to the defendant 
on account of this decision. 
"And I think I remember telling you at the very beginning that defendants have 
a right to put on evidence and to testify if they choose to, but if they choose not to 
they don't have to, that the jury would be specifically instructed not to draw any 
inference from that, or try to speculate as to what their reasoning might have been, or 
any of those sorts of things, because defendants do have a constitutional right to 
remain silent and the state, of course has the entire burden of proof in this case." 
(R232:13). 
During closing argument, defense counsel stated: 
"[W]e didn't call any witnesses, with the exception of some brief questioning 
of the detective, who had already been called as a witness.. . .We didn't do that.. . . 
We don't have to prove anything. We don't have to disprove anything. What we have 
to do is stand back and argue to you that they didn't do their job . . . they didn't prove 
it to you beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(R232:37-38). 
The jury convicted Greuber as charged on both counts (R160-161), and Greuber was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison to a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years to life for 
aggravated kidnaping, and to a consecutive term of five years to life for murder (R250). 
After filing his Notice of Appeal, the case was remanded pursuant to Rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R287-294), and Greuber testified that his trial counsel 
advised him to not accept the State's plea offer because he had a feasible defense (R458:6). 
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Greuber believed there were two possible explanations for Corcoran's knowledge about his 
case, including that Corcoran had learned details "from Larry Rasmussen in a holding cell 
in Davis County court or he had read it out of my discovery" (R458:7). Greuber requested 
that his trial counsel investigate both theories, but his counsel never investigated whether 
Corcoran could have learned details from Larry Rasmussen. (R458:24).2 
Greuber testified that he wanted to take his case to trial to prove his innocence 
(R458:15, 18, 19). Up until the trial, Greuber believed Corcoran had read his discovery and 
hadamotivetolie(R458:7,14). Greuber and his attorneys first learned of the jail recordings 
during the trial (R458:8-9). Had Greuber learned of the recordings prior to trial, he would 
have accepted the State's plea offer, thereby eliminating the minimum mandatory sentence 
and the possibility of a consecutive commitment (R458:9). Greuber further testified that 
immediately when he and his trial counsel became aware of the recordings, they tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade the State to reinstate the plea bargain (R458:10). 
Steven Shapiro and David Finlayson represented Greuber at trial. Shapiro testified 
on remand that he did not read or even look at the State's response to requests for discovery 
in which the recordings were disclosed (R458:56). Shapiro testified that upon becoming 
aware of the recordings, he learned that Greuber no longer had a defense (R458:55-56). 
At the 23B hearing, Shapiro testified that there was a plea offer of murder prior to trial 
apparently, trial counsel did not adequately investigate either theory. Otherwise, 
they would not have found themselves in the predicament of learning they had no defense 
after the State rested. 
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(R458:54). However, in light of Greuber's planned defense, "the difference between being 
convicted of one count and being convicted of both counts wasn't enough to cause [Greuber] 
to plead guilty to something he didn't do." (R458:42). Thus, Greuber and his counsel had 
no significant discussions about resolving the case with a plea prior to trial (R458:42). 
However, when the defense learned of the recordings during trial, the defense ''attempted to 
accept the deal, which was no longer on the table." (R458:53-56, 58). Shapiro testified that 
Greuber would have been "much better off if he had pleaded guilty to murder (R458:40). 
Because the recordings "drastically altered the way the case looked" (R458:31, 36, 48) and 
the defense could no longer "present the evidence which [they] had told the jury that [they] 
were going to present" (R458:33), and because Greuber's defense was irreparably 
compromised, the defense moved for a mistrial (R458:34-36,3 8).3 Had defense counsel been 
aware of the "horribly damaging" recordings, they would have advised Greuber to consider 
the plea offer, because he was in "big trouble" (R458:49-50). 
Finally, although Greuber asked his defense counsel to investigate whether David 
Corcoran had learned details of the murder from Larry Rasmussen while they were in a 
3Shapiro testified: 
"[The recordings] certainly addressed a portion of our defense, but it was a 
portion of our defense that I think was crucial. I mean, there is no question 
about the fact that the existence of those tapes and finding out about them in 
the middle of the trial was devastating to our theory. It caused us to back 
pedal and it caused us to not follow through with the promise we made to 
the jury during open (sic) statements. It was terrible from a Defense (sic) 
standpoint." (R458 at 48). 
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holding cell together, Shapiro testified that nothing came from any such investigations and, 
therefore, that was not a viable defense theory at the time of trial (R458:51). 
Vincent Meister prosecuted Greuber in this case (R45 8:59-60). Meister testified that 
the State extended the plea offer early (R458:60), and that formal notice of the damaging 
telephone recordings was provided to the defense in the State's Fourth Supplemental 
Response to Requests for Discovery dated January 11, 2002, ten months prior to trial 
(R458:62). Meister also had casual conversations with defense counsel prior to trial 
regarding the fact that there were taped telephone conversations that were relevant to 
Greuber's case (R458:66, 68-69). 
Meister testified that after defense counsel finally reviewed the recordings, Shapiro 
asked if the State would consider letting Greuber plead to the murder charge. The State 
declined because Greuber "had plenty of opportunity to plead or come to us and ask us prior 
to [the trial]" to resolve the case viaaplea bargain (R458:70-71). The State would have been 
satisfied with Greuber pleading guilty to murder up until the day of trial (R458:73). The 
State believed that if Greuber resolved the case in the middle of trial, it would be confusing 
to the jury and could prejudice the State's case against the co-defendant (R458:71-72). 
David Finlayson was also defense counsel for Greuber. He testified that the plea offer 
extended by the State was considered by the defense as no offer in light of what they 
considered was Greuber's viable defense (R458:76). Finlayson testified that Greuber trusted 
his counsel and relied upon their advice, and that Greuber's decision to accept or reject the 
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plea offer was based upon that trust and advice (R458:78, 81). 
Prior to learning of the recordings, defense counsel believed all of the State's 
witnesses were impeachable and "attackable on cross examination" because they were 
criminals themselves and had selfish motives for testifying (R458:80). In light of this and 
the serious nature of the charges, trial counsel advised Greuber there was no benefit to him 
pleading guilty to murder (R458: 80-81). Therefore, the State's plea offer was not seriously 
considered by the defense until it was discovered during the middle of trial that Greuber's 
planned defense was no longer viable, at which time Greuber wanted to take the offer, but 
it was no longer an option (R458:79, 83). 
After the hearing on 23B remand, the trial court found that Greuber would not have 
accepted the State's plea offer even if his trial counsel had investigated the compact discs 
(R452-57; Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because plea negotiations are a critical part of a criminal proceeding, a defendant is 
entitled to effective assistance of counsel during that process. Therefore, an attorney's 
failure to investigate evidence militating in favor of accepting a plea bargain is deficient 
performance and prejudicial to a defendant. 
Further, because it is clear from the evidence in this case that Petitioner would have 
accepted - and in fact, tried to accept - the State's plea offer when evidence eliminating his 
defense was revealed, the trial court's finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial 
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counsels' failure to investigate that evidence is clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL DURING PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, AND IS PREJUDICED IN THAT 
PROCESS BY A FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE CRUCIAL EVIDENCE 
This Court granted certiorari on the question of "[w]hether an attorney's failure to 
investigate evidence that would militate in favor of accepting a plea bargain may meet the 
requirement of demonstrating prejudice for an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel." See, Order. Greuber maintains that the Utah Court of Appeals erred as a matter 
of law in holding that a defendant cannot be prejudiced by his counsels' objectively deficient 
performance during the plea bargaining process. 
The court of appeals did not conclude that trial counsels' failure to investigate did not 
constitute objectively deficient performance. Rather, it concluded that notwithstanding 
counsels' failure to investigate, Greuber was not prejudiced by any deficient performance 
during plea negotiations because he is not constitutionally entitled to a plea bargain. State 
v. Grueber, 2005 UT App. 480. It is not Greuber's position that he is entitled to a plea 
bargain. It is his position that he is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during any plea 
negotiations. 
Both federal and State courts recognize a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984) is the seminal case adopted by this Court which established the two-pronged test 
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for determining whether the right to counsel is violated: (1) whether counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) whether the defendant was 
prejudiced by the objectively deficient performance, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results would have been different. See also, 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (reiterating the reasonable probability standard to 
establish prejudice). 
In evaluating a later claim of ineffective assistance in the context of plea negotiations, 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington dealt with a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding, and was premised in part on 
the similarity between such a proceeding and the usual criminal trial, the same two-
part standard seems to us applicable to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the 
plea process. 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). Thus, in the context of plea negotiations, the 
prejudice prong established in Strickland "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally 
ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Id. at 59 (examining this 
issue in the context of a guilty plea and explaining that a defendant must show that but for 
counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have gone to trial). 
It is a matter of record and undisputed in this case that once the contents and significance of 
the compact discs were made known to Greuber and his counsel mid-trial, they asked the 
State to reinstate its plea offer (R458:9-10, 31, 33, 36, 40, 48-50, 53-56, 58, 71-72, 79, 83). 
Therefore, trial counsels' failure to investigate this crucial evidence affected the outcome of 
13 
the plea process. 
This Court has also recognized the right to effective counsel during plea negotiations. 
See, State v. Roj as-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 (holding that because mandatory deportation was 
only a collateral consequence of defendant's guilty plea, counsel's failure to accurately 
advise the defendant of that consequence during plea negotiations did not amount to 
ineffective assistance); see also, State v. Simmons, 5 P.3d 1228 (Utah 2000) (defendant did 
not show that his counsel failed to convey plea offer, and thus did not demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel); State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397,403-404 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing 
the right to competent counsel during plea negotiations) (citing Massiah v. United States, 311 
U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (stating that the right to counsel is necessary during perhaps the most 
critical stage of proceedings - the time of arraignment to the beginning of trial); State v. 
Swindell, 607 P.2d 852, 855 (Wash. 1980) ("presence of counsel during all stages of plea 
bargaining is mandated by the courts"); State v. Johnson, 596 P.2d 308, 312 (Wash. 1979) 
("defendant had the right to have counsel in plea negotiations under the sixth amendment). 
Other federal courts have specifically acknowledged a defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process, and particularly in the context of 
rejecting a plea offer such as occurred in this case. See, Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132 (2nd 
Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001) (holding that the defendant was prejudiced by 
counsel's objectively deficient performance in miscalculating sentence exposure, because 
there was a reasonable probability of a guilty plea in the absence of the incorrect advice, and 
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the sentence the defendant received was more severe than what was possible under the 
rejected plea offer); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376 (2nd Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
defendant's right to counsel during plea negotiations); Bakerv.Barbo, 177 F.3d 149,156 (3rd 
Cir. 1999) (counsel's lack of knowledge of sentencing law was not prejudicial because there 
was no reasonable probability of a lesser sentence if the defendant had pleaded guilty); 
Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that defendants have 
a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, and must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, defendant 
would have pleaded guilty); Magana v. Hoffbauer, 263 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
defendant's right to counsel during plea negotiations) \Patersv. UnitedStates, 159F.3d 1043 
(7th Cir. 1998) (stating defendant must show reasonable probability that he would have 
pleaded guilty absent counsel's errors); United States v. Moore, 950 F.2d 656,660 (10th Cir. 
1991) (explaining that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of 
counsel during plea negotiations). 
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during all critical stages in 
the proceedings, including plea negotiations and a motion to withdraw a plea. See, e.g., 
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1069 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 995, 48 L. 
Ed. 2d 820, 96 S. Ct. 2209 (1976); United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1986), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 93 L. Ed. 2d 845, 107 S. Ct. 893 (1987); United States v. 
Garrett, 90 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.), 
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cert, denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 444, 116 S. Ct. 540 (1995); Garcia v. State, 846 So. 2d 660, 661 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Browning v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1994); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind.App. 5 Dist. 1992); Randall v. 
State, 861 P.2d 314,316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Beats v. State, 802 P.2d 2,4 (Nev. 1990); 
State v. Harell, 80 Wn. App. 802, 804, 911 P.2d 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); see also, 
United States v. TOte,212U.S. App.D.C. 185,659 F.2d 231,233 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Hoyt, 18 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479-480 (D. Pa. 1998). 
In rejecting Greuber's argument that he was prejudiced by his trial counsels' failure 
to investigate during plea negotiations, the court of appeals did not disagree that Greuber's 
trial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance, but relied upon State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) in holding that Greuber was not prejudiced by any ineffective 
assistance during plea negotiations because he is not constitutionally entitled to a plea 
bargain. In footnote 7 of the Knight opinion, this Court stated: 
We are dealing here with the outcome of trial, not the outcome of plea bargaining. 
. . . We have previously rejected claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 
when a defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained his or her right to a fair 
trial. . . . Defendant loses sight of the fact that our state and federal constitutions 
guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains. At most, the cases cited by defendant lend 
indirect support to the proposition that the State cannot enforce a defendant's guilty 
plea and consequent waiver of his right to a fair trial if he has been denied effective 
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to waive his rights. 
Id. at 919 (citations and some punctuation omitted). 
To the extent that Knight stands for the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, it is at odds with the state and federal 
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constitutions as interpreted by the law cited above. However, this Court explicitly 
recognized in Knightthat a guilty plea entered without effective assistance is not enforceable. 
Id. Accordingly, it appears that the court of appeals has misinterpreted the footnote it cites 
in Knight to mean that a defendant is not entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the 
plea negotiations because a defendant has no right to a plea bargain. Notwithstanding the 
fact that a defendant is not entitled to a plea bargain, the court of appeals' holding that a 
defendant is not entitled to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations is 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
An attorney's failure to investigate evidence militating in favor of accepting a plea 
bargain meets both prongs of the Strickland test noted above. Had Greuber's trial counsel 
properly investigated the evidence expressly disclosed to them by the State, Greuber would 
have accepted the State's plea offer and avoided a minimum mandatory consecutive 
sentence. Hence, the outcome in this case would have been different but for counsel's 
ineffective assistance. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT GREUBER 
WOULD NOT HAVE PLEADED GUILTY. 
The second issue this Court granted certiorari on is "[wjhether the record adequately 
supports the district court's finding that Petitioner would not have accepted the State's plea 
offer even if his trial counsel had fully investigated the State's evidence." See, Order. 
After the hearing on 23B remand, the trial court made the following findings: 
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13. Because the defendant had personal knowledge of the date he received his 
discovery materials as supplied by the State, and because he further knew the date 
Corcoran had been transferred from his cell, the defendant also knew that Corcoran 
had not read the discovery materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this 
way. 
15. Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the Court further finds that the 
defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure of his trial counsel to request from 
the State copies of the recorded jailhouse conversations. Even had counsel listened 
to the tapes, or CD's, and discussed them with the defendant, this Court finds that the 
defendant would not have accepted the plea offer from the State because he did not 
want to plead guilty to the charge of Murder. 
R452-57; Addendum B. The court of appeals rejected Greuber's arguments that the trial 
court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence presented both at trial and on 
23B remand. The appellate court stated, 
Although Defendant testified that he would have accepted the plea offer had he 
known of the recordings and their effect on his case, both of his attorneys testified that 
they didn't believe Defendant would accept a plea that involved murder because 
having the aggravated kidnapping charge dropped would have little impact on his 
sentence. The trial court exercised its discretion in believing the attorneys' testimony 
instead of Defendant's testimony. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, 
even considering the facts of this case, Defendant suffered no prejudice from his 
counsel's alleged failure to investigate because he would not have accepted the guilty 
plea. 
State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480, f 8; Addendum A (citing testimony from "David 
Shapiro"4 that initially Greuber would not accept a plea to first-degree murder). 
On direct appeal, an appellant has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence, after 
which an appellate court "will not lightly disturb a trial court's findings of fact" unless they 
4The attorney's name is actually Steven Shapiro. 
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"are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous." Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29,36 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citation omitted). 
The court of appeals did not address the trial court's finding that Greuber had personal 
knowledge of the date he received his discovery and the date Corcoran left his cell, which 
finding Greuber argued below is not supported by any evidence in this case. Greuber 
maintains this position. There is no evidence to support a finding that at the time of trial, 
Greuber was aware of the fact that Corcoran had moved to a different cell before Greuber 
received his discovery. In fact at the hearing on 23B remand, Greuber testified that up until 
trial, he believed Corcoran had read his discovery (R458: 7-8). There is no reason why 
Greuber would find the sequence of events significant at the time they occurred. The only 
evidence on the record is that Greuber was mistaken as to what that sequence was. 
The court of appeals' conclusion that the record supports the trial court's finding that 
Greuber would not have accepted the State's plea offer is equally unsupported by the 
evidence in this case. The evidence in support of the trial court's finding that Greuber would 
not have pleaded guilty to murder includes Greuber's trial counsels' testimony that prior to 
trial, Greuber maintained his innocence and never seriously entertained the State's plea offer 
due to the nominal benefit of having the aggravated kidnaping charge dropped (R458:42,80-
1), the fact that the State's witnesses were primarily impeachable drug addicts with selfish 
motives for testifying (R458:76, 80), and in light of Greuber's planned defense that David 
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Corcoran learned the details of the crime from reading his discovery. 
The trial court also found that Greuber had an alternative defense theory that Corcoran 
learned about details of the case from Larry Rasmussen while they were in a holding cell 
together (Addendum B, *ftl 1), although Greuber's defense counsel never investigated this 
theory (R458:51). The trial court found from this evidence that Greuber would not have 
accepted the State's plea offer even if his counsel had been aware of the compact discs and 
their significance prior to trial. Id. at ^ [15. 
Prior to trial, Greuber's counsel advised him not to accept the State's plea offer 
(R458:42,49-50,76,78, 80-1). Greuber trusted his trial counsel and relied upon their advice 
(R458:78, 80-1). When trial counsels' deficient performance and the adverse effect it had 
upon Greuber's defense became apparent during trial, even the prosecutor testified that the 
defense tried to persuade the State to reinstate the plea offer (R458:9-10, 31, 33, 36,40,48-
50, 53-56, 58, 71-72, 79, 83). Greuber's trial counsel testified that once the content and the 
"horribly damaging" significance of the compact discs was revealed, the case was 
"drastically altered" such that Greuber would have been much better off accepting the plea 
offer; otherwise he would be in "big trouble" (R458:31, 33, 36, 38, 40, 48-50). 
In light of this record evidence, the trial court's finding that Greuber would not have 
accepted the plea offer even after discovering the compact discs, is untenable. The court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the record supports the trial court's findings that Greuber 
would not have pleaded guilty even if his trial counsel had rendered effective assistance. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
Greuber respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision in this case and remand the matter for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this O day of June, 2006. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
*H mXYhA 
Jennifer Gowans v 
Attorneys for Mr. Greuber 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant 
Attorney General Matthew D. Bates, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854. Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this fo^day of May, 2006. 
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OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and McHugh. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber Jr. appeals his 
conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code section 76-5-203, see Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (2003), and aggravated kidnapping, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-
302, see id. § 76-5-302 (2003). We affirm. 
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because counsel failed to conduct a 
reasonable investigation, i.e., obtaining and listening to 
audio tapes of Defendant's telephone conversations that 
undermined the defense strategy. Defendant asserts that 
this failure prejudiced him because it deprived him of the 
benefit of a plea bargain. Where a trial court rules on a 
defendant's [*2] ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
at a remand hearing pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 23 B, 
the defendant's "ineffective assistance claim on appeal 
presents us with a mixed question of law and fact." State 
v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
"Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings of 
fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness." Id. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, '"a defendant must 
show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as 
to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different.'" Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, P20, 
94 P.3d 211 (quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). "Failure to satisfy 
either prong will result in our concluding that counsel's 
behavior was not ineffective." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT 
App 288, P38, 55P.3dll31. 
Applying [*3] these principles to the present case, 
we conclude that Defendant's claim fails because he 
suffered no prejudice. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1226 (Utah 1993) ("When confronted with a claim of 
ineffective assistance, we may choose not to consider the 
adequacy of counsel's performance if we determine that 
any claimed error was not harmful."). Defendant argues 
that he was prejudiced because, but for his trial counsel's 
failure to investigate and discover the defects in the 
defense strategy, Defendant would have accepted the 
plea bargain offered by the State - to drop the charge of 
aggravated kidnapping in exchange for Defendant 
pleading guilty to murder. However, Defendant "loses 
sight of the fact that our state and federal constitutions 
guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." State v. Geary, 
Page 2 
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707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985)\ see, e.g., Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S Ct. 838, 122 L. Ed. 
2d 180 (1993) ("Unreliability or unfairness does not 
result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive 
the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to 
which the law entitles him."). "We have previously 
rejected claims alleging ineffective [*4] assistance of 
counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea bargain and 
has retained his or her right to a fair trial." State v. 
Knight, 734P.2d913, 919n.7(Utah 1987). 
These cases are dispositive. Indeed, the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim rejected in Knight - "that 
counsel could not advise [the defendant] effectively as to 
the wisdom of accepting or rejecting plea bargain offers 
without the information that was withheld by the 
prosecution," id. ~ is similar to Defendant's claim. 
Defendant does not contend that he was denied his right 
to a fair trial but only "that he was prejudiced by his 
[trial] counsel's] deficient performance during the plea 
bargaining process." However, because Defendant has no 
right to a plea bargain, see Geary, 707 P.2d at 646, he 
could not be prejudiced by any purported deficient 
performance during the plea bargaining process. 
Accordingly, Defendant's claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel fails. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding 
that Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to listen to the audio tapes because "Defendant 
would not have accepted the plea offer from [*5] the 
State because he did not want to plead guilty to murder." 
nl We review a trial court's factual findings for clear 
error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
"For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide 
that the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination." Id. at 935-36. Also, "it is the 
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of 
witnesses." Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, Pll, 22 
P.3d 1249 (alteration in original) (citation and quotations 
omitted). 
nl This finding bolsters our conclusion that 
Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's performance. 
The trial court's finding is supported by the record. 
Although Defendant testified that he would have 
accepted the plea offer had he known of the recordings 
and their effect on his case, both of his attorneys testified 
[*6] that they didn't believe Defendant would accept a 
plea that involved murder because having the aggravated 
kidnapping charge dropped would have little impact on 
his sentence. n2 The trial court exercised its discretion in 
believing the attorneys' testimony instead of Defendant's 
testimony. This finding is not clearly erroneous 
Therefore, even considering the facts of the case, 
Defendant suffered no prejudice from his counsel's 
alleged failure to investigate because he would not have 
accepted the guilty plea. 
n2 For example, David Shapiro, one of 
Defendant's attorneys, testified that from his 
conversations with Defendant, he "believed that 
[Defendant] said he wasn't going to plead guilty 
to first-degree murder, and we would go to trial if 
that's the best they were going to offer." 
Accordingly, Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON RULE 23B REMAND 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT ON RULE 
23B REMAND 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : CRIMINAL NO. 011916865 
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER, JR., : 
Defendant. s 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 24, 
2 0 04, pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
matter was remanded to this Court by an Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, dated April 7, 2 004. 
The State appeared through Matthew D- Bates and Christopher 
Ballard, and the defendant was present and represented by counsel, 
Jennifer K. Gowans. The Court, having heard the evidence offered 
by both parties, does hereby make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 13, 20 01, the State offered the defendant a 
plea agreement in this case which would have the defendant plead 
guilty to the charge of Murder, a First Degree Felony, and the 
State would then ask the Court to dismiss the charge of Aggravated 
Kidnapping. 
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2. This offer of settlement was conveyed by the defendant's 
counsel to him. 
3. The defendant rejected the State's offer, because he was 
unwilling to plead guilty to the charge of Murder. The defendant 
was advised by his attorneys that the sentence for Murder would 
likely be 2 0 years in the state penitentiary. Dropping the 
Aggravated Kidnapping charge, the defendant felt, would only 
nominally benefit him, and would have little impact on his 
sentence. 
4. The defendant believed, as did his counsel, that the 
defendant would prevail at trial because they felt that the State's 
case was weak in that it consisted mostly of the testimony of gang 
members and drug addicts who were subject to effective impeachment. 
5. The State did not at any time renew its plea offer after 
it was initially rejected by the defendant, even though the 
defendant expressed an interest in accepting that offer after the 
close of the State's evidence at trial. 
6. On January 11, 2002, the State served the defendant's 
counsel with the Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for 
Discovery. This document disclosed the existence of the recordings 
of telephone calls made by the defendant from the Davis County 
Jail. This Response stated that the State would make the defendant 
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copies of the recordings if he would provide blank compact discs or 
audio cassettes. 
7. The defendant was aware while he was housed in the Davis 
County Jail that his telephone calls were subject to being 
recorded. 
8. The defendant's trial counsel, Steven Shapiro, and David 
Finlayson, did not request copies of those recorded telephone 
conversations or listen to them before trial. 
9. One of the State's witnesses at trial was a jailhouse 
informant, David Corcoran. Mr. Corcoran testified at trial that 
the defendant admitted his guilt to the Murder and Aggravated 
Kidnapping charges in this case. 
10. The defendant and Corcoran were cellmates in the maximum 
security wing of the Davis County Jail from November 8, 2001 to 
November 19, 2 0 01. On or about November 19, 2 001, Mr. Corcoran was 
transferred into the general jail population and had no further 
contact with the defendant. 
11. A part of the defendant's trial strategy was to impeach 
Mr. Corcoran fs testimony by attempting to show that Corcoran 
fabricated the defendant's confession after reading police reports 
and other materials that the defendant had in his possession while 
they were cellmates. In addition, the defendant thought he could 
impeach Mr. Corcoran's testimony by demonstrating that Corcoran had 
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learned about the details of this case from a Mr. Larry Rasmussen, 
who was a co-defendant of this defendant. Corcoran and Rasmussen 
had been housed together in a holding cell at one time. 
12. In some of the calls recorded after Mr. Corcoran was 
transferred out of the defendant's cell, the defendant stated that 
he had not yet received the discovery materials supplied by the 
State of Utah. Therefore, Corcoran could not have learned about 
the case details from reading those reports. 
13. Because the defendant had personal knowledge of the date 
he received his discovery materials as supplied by the State, and 
because he further knew the date Corcoran had been transferred from 
his cell, the defendant also knew that Corcoran had not read the 
discovery materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this 
way. 
14. While it is true that Corcoran provided critical 
testimony against the defendant, there were eyewitnesses to the 
murder who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crimes. 
15. Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the 
Court further finds that the defendant suffered no prejudice from 
the failure of his trial counsel to request from the State copies 
of the recorded jailhouse conversations. Even had counsel listened 
to the tapes, or CD's, and discussed them with the defendant, this 
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Court finds that the defendant would not have accepted the plea 
offer from the State because he did not want to plead guilty to the 
charge of Murder. 
Dated this \n day of September, 2004. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
